A legal battle in the South China
20/8/14
The Philippines’ arbitral
proceedings against China regarding the dispute in the South China Sea are now
officially under way in the Netherlands. President Aquino’s administration
initiated arbitration proceedings against China under Annex VII of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In response to the
Philippines’ lawsuit, the People’s Republic of China rejected the diplomatic
note and its attached notification from Manila.
The Tribunal proceedings will be
followed closely not only by Filipino and Chinese authorities, but also by the
other four claimants involved in the dispute, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan
and Vietnam. Among them, the Vietnamese authorities are the strongest
opponents to the Chinese claims, even though it is unlikely that Hanoi will
follow Manila in seeking international legal recource to challenge Beijing.
Part of the process is meant to
determine if the tribunal has jurisdiction over Manila’s complaint. The case
will only proceed once the tribunal decides that the complaint filed by the
Philippines has legal merit and falls under its jurisdiction. In any case, the
Philippines assert that China’s so-called nine-dash-line claim, which virtually
encompasses the entire South China Sea, including sections that have been
declared as whose own maritime zone, is contrary to UNCLOS and thus unlawful.
Although the map with the nine-dash
line is said, according to Chinese sources, to have been published in 1947 or
1948 by the Chinese Ministry of Interior (that is, prior to the creation of the
People’s Republic of China), China officially relied on the map for the
first time in its response to the 2009 Joint Submission to the UN Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) of Vietnam and Malaysia. “To
this day—write Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy in a recent article
published by ‘The American Journal of International Law’– the purpose behind
the recent production of the map remains uncertain, as China has not clarified
whether the map is to be understood as evidence supporting its claim or merely
as a graphical depiction of it. More generally, it is uncertain whether the map
has any legal relevance to the delimitation of China’s boundaries in the South
China Sea.”
In this context, the question arises
whether the map could indeed be considered as evidence in support of China’s
claim. “Maps do not constitute titles in international law. The
principle that emerges from international jurisprudence and doctrinal
discussions is that cartographic materials do not by themselves have any legal
value,” the two experts state. And it would probably be essential to know if an
international court or tribunal will agree to take into account the
nine-dashline map when adjudicating a potential sovereignty claim by China
regarding the South China Sea.
Secondly, the
Tribunal is asked to clarify if China can make its claims for land, including
islands. This implies that the Tribunal will need to make a ruling on whether
certain “islands” occupied by China are in fact islands. China does not
distinguish between insular features that qualify as “islands” within the
meaning of UNCLOS (and which would thereby generate rights to a full Exclusive
Economic Zone and continental shelf) and those qualifying as “rocks” (which
would thereby generate rights only to internal and territorial waters). As
established by Article 121 of the UNCLOS, “Rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf.” This means that only features above water are considered
islands capable of supporting a 12-mile territorial sea. Until today, China
has never provided a legal clarification of its territorial claims in the South
China Sea, basing its maritime claims on its land sovereignty.
Last but not least, the
Tribunal will also have to rule on whether China’s claims to “historic rights”
give it legal rights to the resources inside the nine-dashline. The first
Chinese chronological reference to “historic rights” is found in China’s
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act of June 26, 1998.
Both Vietnamese and the Filipino
authorities argue that China has no right to resources outside the 12 nautical
miles of territorial sea. “In the South China Sea—East Sea as referred to by the
Vietnamese–China is unable to present historical evidence of its claim. Its
territory was historically limited to Hainan island; thus the Chinese used
force to illegally occupy rocks, features and islands in the Paracel and
Spratly archipelagos,” Prof. Pham Dang Phuoc, Rector of Pham Van Dong
University, remarked at the end of the workshop ‘Sovereignty over Paracel and
Spratly Archipelagos: Historical and Legal Aspects’, held in Quang Ngai at the
end of April.
While the position China would adopt
in a hypothetical dispute settlement procedure is unknown, “no
international court or tribunal would agree to base its decision on arguments
and contested evidence to the effect that China was the first country (several
hundred years ago) to explore the South China Sea and discover, name, and
administer its islands. Mere reliance on alleged historical evidence of the
kind invoked by Chinese commentators is insufficient to establish sovereignty
over the waters enclosed by the nine-dash line or the islands of the South
China Sea,” Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy underline in their article.
All comments [ 0 ]
Your comments