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China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute: Divide and Conquer ASEAN
China’s policy on the South China Sea dispute: Divide and Conquer ASEAN
22/6/15
After
a decade of silence, the South China Sea (SCS) conflict has once again arisen
to the top of the East Asian security debate. This conflict is in many ways a
litmus test of China’s
relations with ASEAN and its member states. ASEAN has become openly divided on
how the SCS should be handled (multilaterally or bilaterally); this could
undermine the viability of successful pursuit of constructive engagement.
Now, ASEAN has a China problem.
Ask the ten members about China,
and you’ll get a kaleidoscope of opinions about what that country represents.
Some ASEAN countries are very much pro-China: their own economic development is
tied closely to Beijing’s, and they are
comfortable with the political implications of their China connections. Others are
cooler on relations with Beijing:
they balance a wariness of Chinese influence with the obvious benefits of a
healthy trading relationship. And finally, there are those that feel threatened
by China
and regard themselves as targets (or at least potential targets) of Chinese
assertiveness.
Unity on the question of how to handle China has
therefore eluded ASEAN. And given the association’s nature, this is
unsurprising: neutrality and non-intervention, not unity and collectivism, are
ASEAN’s most cherished principles.
There’s no doubt that ASEAN is split on
the issue of China
and territorial disputes. What is less clear is whether ASEAN’s disunity is
simply playing into China’s hands, allowing it to deal with each country
individually, or whether Beijing is actively driving a wedge between ASEAN
members that oppose China and those that are more sympathetic to the Chinese
position.
“Beijing
has consistently pursued a strategy to prevent the South China Sea issue
[becoming] one between China
and ASEAN,” suggests Zhang Baohui, an associate professor at Lingnan University.
“It has argued that the any conflict is bilateral. To this end, Beijing has succeeded by
using a few Southeast Asian countries to prevent the emergence of a united
ASEAN agenda or strategy.” Zhang points to China’s
economic leverage over Cambodia
and Thailand in particular,
and also to the fact that these two countries (and several others within ASEAN)
have no direct stake in the South China Sea
disputes. Their membership of ASEAN is their only real link to these affairs.
The spotlight has
fallen on Cambodia
especially: the country is China’s
closest regional ally and a major beneficiary of economic aid from Beijing. In 2012, ASEAN’s
summit of foreign ministers in Cambodia, attended by the foreign ministers of
the 10-member bloc in 2012, was to have ended with an endorsement of its
position on a range of regional issues, most of all on the highly-charged issue
of conflicting claims with China to territory in the South China Sea, which has
become Asia’s
biggest potential military flashpoint.
Yet
when it came to it there was no final communiqué – for the first time in
Asean’s 45-year history. As chair of the
summit, Cambodia refused to
allow the Philippines,
supported by Vietnam,
to include in a communiqué language that referred to a recent stand-off between
its naval vessels and Chinese government ships over the
Scarborough Shoal, a reef claimed by both countries. Cambodia
insisted that such disputes were bilateral, which is Chinese policy on the
issue.
Irrespective of
the extent of Beijing’s control over Cambodia, its
ability to split ASEAN – whether intentional or coincidental – is undeniable.
However, China
is also one of the few issues with the power to unite ASEAN.
Since at least
August last year, China has
been officially advocating what officials have called a “dual track approach”
with respect to the South China Sea issue. Beijing continues to use
this approach in discussions today. While the approach itself could be
dismissed as old wine in new bottles by close observers, it nonetheless
deserves critical examination because it may be quite deceiving to the
untrained eye.
The dual track, in Beijing’s
eyes, envisages: 1) the handling of bilateral disputes by the countries
directly concerned through negotiations; 2) the maintenance of peace and
stability in the South China Sea through joint efforts of China and the
ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
A “dual track
approach” works to China’s
advantage because it seeks to divide both ASEAN and other potential forces that
could counter Beijing’s behavior as well as the
very aspects of the South China Sea issue as well.
The dual track approach facilitates China’s
preference for a divided ASEAN on the South China Sea
issue. Note that ASEAN only appears in the second track – “the maintenance of
peace and stability in the South China Sea” –
but has no role when it comes to the “handling of bilateral disputes,” which is
restricted only to the four ASEAN claimant states. Here, China is essentially repeating its long-held
view that disputes should be resolved bilaterally between it and claimant
states – Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Vietnam
– rather than with ASEAN as a whole or the interference of other external
parties. This works to its advantage because it is easier for Beijing
to take on individual ASEAN countries than the organization collectively or
even a sub-group of countries, particularly given the vast asymmetries in
capabilities in China’s
favor.
By advocating two
separate tracks on maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and
the handling of bilateral disputes, China is able to divide aspects of
the issue as well. Beijing’s “incremental assertiveness” in the South
China Sea, including the seizure of individual features and massive
land reclamation activities, can be seen as efforts to enforce its “nine-dash
line” claim relative to other claimants, which is no business of ASEAN’s.
Nonetheless, it’s clear that the member
states which feel most insecure about China
– the Philippines and Vietnam – had hoped for at least some ASEAN
solidarity in managing their territorial disputes with Beijing
in the South China Sea. They didn’t get it.
Beijing is obviously aware that its strategy, in the short
term at least, incurs huge diplomatic costs. To offset these costs, China has tried to gain support from some
South-East Asian nations so that the other claimants are not able to forge a
regional alliance on this issue to isolate China./.
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All comments [ 12 ]
Beijing has consistently pursued a strategy to prevent the South China Sea issue becoming one between China and ASEAN.
By advocating two separate tracks on maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and the handling of bilateral disputes, China is able to divide aspects of the issue as well.
ASEAN balances a wariness of Chinese influence with the obvious benefits of a healthy trading relationship.
So wicked, China!
Vietnam needs to be aware of that scheme, and we have issued measures to deal with that to protect our interests.
Beijing continues to use this approach in discussions today.
This could undermine the viability of successful pursuit of constructive engagement. We must seek an united consensus in ASEAN for the South China Sea issue.
I have not believed Cambodia, Laos are ok, they know and understand us, but Cambodia and Khmer people, they are so extreme!
China has been officially advocating what officials have called a “dual track approach” with respect to the South China Sea issue.
ASEAN needs to reach a consensus in the South China Sea issue, they have to resolve this peacefully.
some countries disagree with china's claim and illegal activities in the East Sea, but haven't expressed their stance due to economic interest with china
it's so utilitarian, that is why the unity of ASEAN in the East Sea difficully become true
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