Defendant Nguyen Van Dai (standing, front) at the trial on April 5

The Hanoi People’s Court on April 5 opened the trial of six defendants accused of “trying to overthrow the people’s administration” under Clause 1, Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code.

The defendants include Nguyen Van Dai (born in 1969 and residing in Back Khoa ward of Hai Ba Trung district, Hanoi), Pham Van Troi (born in 1972 and residing in Chuong Duong commune of Thuong Tin district, Hanoi) and Nguyen Trung Ton (born in 1972 and residing in Quang Yen commune of Quang Xuong district, Thanh Hoa province).

The three others are Nguyen Bac Truyen (born in 1968 and residing in Ward 4 of District 4, Ho Chi Minh City), Truong Minh Duc (born in 1960 and residing in Vinh Thuan town of Vinh Thuan district, Kien Giang province) and Le Thu Ha (born in 1982 and residing in Dong Giang ward of Dong Ha city, Quang Tri province).

There are six lawyers defending the six defendants at the trial.

According to the indictment of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, from March 2013 to July 2017, Nguyen Van Dai, Pham Van Troi, Nguyen Trung Ton and Nguyen Bac Truyen initiated and established the “Hoi anh em dan chu” (Brotherhood for Democracy) organisation. They built the organisation’s platform, statutes and regulations and also steered its activities.

Dai and his accessories induced Truong Minh Duc, Le Thu Ha and some others to set up representative offices and a website of the organisation and build a “brief platform” of “Hoi anh em dan chu”. This organisation had a strict structure, strategies for internal and external affairs, and activities to develop its membership.

The indictment said the defendants took advantage of fighting for “democracy, human rights” and “civil society” to conceal the purposes of “Hoi anh em dan chu”. They connected with foreign organisations and illegal organisations in Vietnam to seek overseas support and financial aid and conduct propaganda against the State, aiming that when their force was strong enough and the time was right, they would publicly confront the administration and change the political regime in Vietnam so as to build a regime of “pluralism, multiparty” and “separation of powers” and topple the people’s administration.

According to the Supreme People’s Procuracy, Nguyen Van Dai was the mastermind and acted as the second Vice President of “Hoi anh em dan chu”. He built the platform of the organisation, engaged in discussing and planning operation methods and developing the force, and induced Le Thu Ha to take part.

Dai was also accused of training and instructing other members about methods and experience of implementing activities, setting up schemes and contacting foreign organisations and individuals to call for donation, and receiving 71,726 USD and 9,161 EUR financed for activities of “Hoi anh em dan chu”. He was accused of conducting propaganda against the State.

Meanwhile, Pham Van Troi founded and acted as President of “Hoi anh em dan chu”, held positions in charge of the organisation’s activities in the northern region, and built the platform. He was accused of discussing and planning development of the organisation’s membership, inducing six people to join “Hoi anh em dan chu”, and guiding other members about methods and experience of implementing activities.

Troi was also accused of being in charge of the fund of “Hoi anh em dan chu”, directing the organisation’s members to oppose the National Assembly election in May 2016, and conducting anti-State propaganda.

The trial is scheduled to last through April 6.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been re-elected with an overwhelming 97.08% of the vote. He won the trust of the vast majority of Egyptian voters after a term in which he led the country in overcoming the Arab Spring “storm”. However, the four years of his new term promise to be a tough challenge, as President al-Sisi will have to deal with the thorny security problem while restoring the economy, and bringing the country of pyramids back to the trajectory of development and prosperity.

Immediately after the results of the election were announced, people across Egypt poured into the streets to celebrate the victory of President al-Sisi. The former military commander-in-chief, born in 1954, left many imprints during his first presidential term, firmly guiding the country through difficulties after the outbreak of the waves of rebellion in 2011 and the political fluctuations following the dethronement of former President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Since coming to power in June 2014, President al-Sisi has guided the land of the Pyramids through a vortex of violence, while reinvigorating its ailing economy and restoring Egypt’s position in the international arena. Egypt’s politics has been strengthened and maintained after a three-phase transitional process was completed with a successful parliamentary election held in late 2015.

The Egyptian people’s near unanimous confidence in President al-Sisi is both a motivation and a pressure for him in the new tenure. Although Egypt has escaped the tide of conflict, the threats from the “ghost of terrorism” to this country still remain. Therefore, ensuring security and stability will be the tasks of top priority. Regardless of the security measures taken by the Government, including the Sinai Campaign launched in early February, Egypt still has to cope with the risks of terrorist attacks from different extremist organisations, most dangerously the branch of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Sinai and a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which has already been banned from operating in Egypt. In 2017, Egypt suffered a series of bloody strikes carried out by IS aimed at security forces, the Christian community, and Muslims.

One of the other priorities of President al-Sisi in the new term is to promote economic development, attract foreign investment, realise the “big projects” that he put forward in his first tenure, create employment for labourers, enhance the educational and healthcare systems, and to implement social security policies. Egypt will have to maintain its achievements, such as the restoration of the tourism industry, which has brought in a large amount of foreign currency revenue, and the exploitation of the Suez Canal, a vitally important sea route that is on the path to full recovery of operations. The continuous implementation of policies on reform and foreign investment attraction will remain a focus in the policy of the al-Sisi administration. However, President al-Sisi also faces a lot of challenges, as Egypt’s economic recovery is not yet stable, and foreign debt is continuously increasing, climbing up to US$80.8 billion by the end of 2017. In addition, Egypt has to demonstrate its efforts to reform and implement austerity policies to secure funding for development projects borrowed from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and many financial institutions.

As one of the countries pioneering the addressal of regional issues, Egypt continues to foster its special relationship with its regional allies, as well as continually strengthening its relations with world powers. Shortly after the Egyptian National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced the reelection of President al-Sisi, US President Donald Trump extended his congratulations via a phone call, in which the White House leader reaffirmed the strategic partnership between the US and Egypt. The support of such world powers for President al-Sisi is expected to make it more convenient for him when implementing foreign policies intended to enhance Egypt’s position in the region and around the world.

President al-Sisi has been entrusted by the Egyptian people with the responsibility of leading the country for one more term with a huge workload to address. He has been said to have made bold decisions and needs just one more term to complete these steps. The Egyptian people expect that President al-Sisi will help them to realise their aspirations, and bring the country of pyramids firmly forwards on its path to recovery.

President of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) Central Committee Tran Thanh Man extended Easter greetings to Catholic and Protestant dignitaries and followers in Hanoi while visiting the Hanoi Archdiocese and the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (North) on April 3.

In a meeting with Archbishop of the Hanoi Archdiocese Cardinal Pierre Nguyen Van Nhon, Man highlighted the country’s outstanding achievements of socio-economic development and major activities in the front work in 2017, saying that Catholics nationwide have made great contributions to attainments. He expressed his belief that Cardinal Pierre Nguyen Van Nhon will encourage Catholic dignitaries and followers in the Hanoi Archdiocese to continue participating in patriotic movements and campaigns launched by the VFF, and implementing a programme on environmental protection and climate change adaptation. Cardinal Pierre Nguyen Van Nhon promised to continuously encourage parishioners to abide by legal regulations, and join hands in consolidating the national great unity bloc. While visiting the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (North), Man said he believed head of the church Pastor Nguyen Huu Mac will work to encourage the Protestant community to join social activities and patriotic movements launched by the VFF. Pastor Nguyen Huu Mac thanked for the Party, State and VFF’s attention to and facilitation for the church’s activities and the development of its chapters in localities. He affirmed the church will make more contributions to the national construction and defence.

Amidst current extensive globalization and international integration, hostile forces have made adverse adjustments to their artifices of “peaceful evolution” strategies in a bid to oppose the Vietnamese revolution. Therefore, thoroughly grasping those artifices to formulate sound countermeasures is a matter of great significance and urgency to the Party, people, and the Army.

Hostile forces have been employing malicious artifices to consistently and vigorously oppose the Vietnamese revolution with a view to toppling Communist Party of Vietnam’s leadership, and subsequently removing Vietnamese socialist regime. Recently, those artifices have been carried out in an increasingly diverse and merciless manner in response to domestic and international developments.

First, fine-tuning diplomatic policies via multi-faceted cooperation to infiltrate and step up “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” process in Vietnam. Whilst maximally restricting themselves to contentious issues in their relationships with Vietnam, hostile forces further infiltrate and strengthen “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” process through extensive relationship expansion. They have fostered conditional military-defence, economic-commercial collaboration and investment promotion to compel, steer, and pressurize Vietnam into amending policies and laws as a basis for transformation of political regime. This move is aimed at executing a “democratic” screenplay in Vietnam, steering Vietnamese diplomatic policies to their intentions in which they approach and support the “pro-Western” dissidents; cause an upheaval in “self-transformation”; accelerate diplomatic exchange activities to promote their image of “Western-style friendly diplomacy”; further infiltrate through intelligence trickery in order to “transform” Vietnam; and impede Vietnam’s potential investment partners. Simultaneously, they find every way to create imbalance in Vietname’s strategic relationships with its great powers; to ignite disagreement amongst Vietnam and its neighbouring nations and ASEAN countries; and to sever Vietnam-Lao special relationship, Vietnam-China and Vietnam-Russia strategic partnership in an attempt to isolate Vietnam from the international arena.

Second, strengthening infiltration and collusive activities to promote “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” process from inside. To this end, they spare no effort to use dissidents to secretly set up political forces and organizations, which act as a key and decisive element in bringing about the transformation to Vietnamese political regime. On the one hand, they resort to cruel cunning artifices such as bribery, psychological incitement to cause internal sectarian division in an effort to step-by-step break down solidarity and unity amongst Party, State, and social organizations. On the other, they capitalize on political dissidents and opportunists and public indignation to distort or exaggerate the weaknesses and shortcomings for the purpose of inciting the masses’ protests and rally, and disrupting political security and social order and safety. Their plot is to divide close relations among all-level Party and governmental offices and armed forces and people; to support and facilitate opposition forces’ activities in an effort to shake ideological foundation and undermine political and social stability. This plot is regularly carried out with a focus on such special occasions as Party congresses, National Assembly and all-level People’s Council elections, and national celebrations. Their common artifices are to manipulate and bribe retired bigwigs, especially those cadres with disciplinary records and signs of disaffection to “give recommendations to the Party”; “position papers”; “legal initiatives”, etc through which they overstate difficulties and shortcomings as well as retired cadres’ interests inferior to that of working cadres so as to trigger public furore. In addition, they also use various blatant trickery to cause political apathy amongst Vietnam’s young and student generations.

Third, stepping up infiltration activities to steer the Vietnamese media to their intentions of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation”. Their plot of the media “democratization” is intended to incorporate “democracy” into the national media, and facilitate the expansion and development of the unofficial media system which acts as a breeding ground for opposing the Vietnamese revolution on account of its enormous effects on societal life and ineffective control and censorship by national management authorities. To this end, they have used the modern media facilities with a large volume of broadcasting stations, publications, and other media facilities by Vietnamese expatriates in exile to distort Vietnam’s situation while taking full advantage of social networks to demand “freedom of the press”; “freedom of speech”, and the establishment of private press; to separate the national media and press from the Party leadership and State management; fully capitalizing on the potential and strength of the external press and media to “dominate” the internal one; approaching and manipulating the Vietnamese press and media, keeping them further away from the Party’s press motto, objectives and orientations; encouraging and facilitating the setup of sprawling websites, facebook accounts and blogs, etc; and misusing the Internet to build a myriad of websites and blogs with misleading contents. It is particularly worrying that a majority of Internet users in Vietnam at present and in the foreseeable future are teenagers, pupils, and students, hence false and misleading information renders them prone to deviant orientation pertaining to historical and social affairs, and Party guidelines and policies; to shake confidence and actions in opposition to the masses’ and peoples’ interests; to be in collusion with hostile forces to go against the Party and socialist regime.

They foster the creation of fake websites and blog platforms impersonating Party and State leaders and revolution veterans to deceive public opinion and attract viewers. When those media platforms draw in a high number of visitors, they upload the incremental amount of false and distorted information, causing readers’ confusion and leading to improper thinking and behaviour. In particular, they take full advantage of social networks to rapidly connect members, disseminate reactionary ideology, distort Party guidelines and State laws, divide close relationships amongst the Party, the State and people, circulate false information, and arouse suspicion about sensitive issues in society.

Fourth, hastily executing a malicious artifice of “peaceful evolution” in education and training field to “transform” Vietnam. Education and training field is considered one of the breakthrough, shortest, most effective factors to implement “self-evolution” and “self-transformation”, steer the Vietnamese education to Western trajectory. To this end, they conduct a double-edged policy. On the one hand, they launch a campaign of twisting and negating Vietnamese education and training accomplishments, stating that the root cause of the status quo of Vietnamese education results from the Party’s misguided policies of education and training leadership and the State’s ineffective management which is regarded as a pretext for calling for a reform in Vietnamese education’s situation via “Western enlightenment”. On the other, they make continued effort to promote, embellish, and exaggerate the Western education, which is considered an ideal destination for Vietnam’s young generation to “brighten their country’s future”. They actively utilize enticing trickery such as holding conferences, talks, exhibitions of overseas study, visiting well-known universities in a bid to entice Vietnamese students to go overseas for study, thereby building a “generation of pro-Western cadres”, who hold key positions economically, socially, and politically. To make matters worse, they demand the exclusion of subjects pertaining to Marxist-Leninist theory, Ho Chi Minh thought, and Communist Party of Vietnam guidelines from training curricula and a freedom of ideological system for teachers and students, thereby facilitating their political schemes.

Fifth, continuously intensifying various activities of “depoliticalized” armed forces. Their ultimate goal is to make our armed forces lose political directions, and give up fighting objectives. They have been taking full advantage of this scheme to negate Communist Party of Vietnam’s leadership over Vietnamese People’s Army and Public Security in an increasingly frequent and cunning fashion. On the ideological and theoretical fronts, they strive to negate Marxist-Leninist viewpoints on class and class struggle; distort Ho Chi Minh military ideology and the Party’s military guidelines and viewpoints; undermine the nature and traditions of the Army and Public Security; promote “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” amongst cadres and soldiers whilst negating the principle of “the Party’s direct and absolute leadership on all fronts” over armed forces; scrapping the operation of party and political work and the system of political offices and cadres at all level in the Army; and defaming the Army and Public Security. With cunning operations, they infiltrate disaffected members into the Army and Public Security; take full advantage of the dark side of market economy and social vices to falsify the tradition and revolutionary nature of the Army and Public Security, to tarnish the sacred image of “Uncle Ho’s soldiers”, etc.

Those afore-mentioned artifices of “peaceful evolution” strategy by hostile forces are amongst the most fundamental and noticeable ones with increasing level of sophistication, craftiness and malice. Therefore, it is vital to stay constantly vigilant about identifying and analyzing in a bid to expose the nature and work out proper countermeasures to deal with those malevolent artifices.

A workshop was held in Ho Chi Minh City on April 2 on international experience in making and implementing policies targeting ethnic minority groups.

Nguyen Dinh Cung, Director of the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), said studying ethnic minority policies of other countries will help Vietnam overhaul its ethnic policies in the future.

He added the event aimed to gain an insight into some countries’ viewpoints and policies on ethnic minority groups, including those on minorities’ languages, migration, education, health care, ethnic cadre development, land, poverty reduction, employment, cultural preservation and religious affairs.

Dr Tran Van Ha from the Institute of Anthropology under the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, who has studied policies on ethnic minorities in some Southeast Asian nations, said all ethnic policies of the countries aim to consolidate community and national solidarity. Building national cultural characteristics is considered important in developing national unity.

Vietnam needs to focus on building national cultural identities and sustainably developing ethnic groups’ culture. It is also necessary to create development policies for each region and policies for specific ethnic groups, he noted.

At the workshop, participants discussed the socio-economic development framework for ethnic minority areas in Vietnam for 2016-2020. They said the country needs to build a sustainable infrastructure system, develop production, trade, services, tourism, science and technology while also making special policies on poverty elimination, credit and employment for ethnic minorities.

Existing policies should match the socio-economic development plans of regions nationwide, including border regions which are home to many ethnic minorities and adjacent areas, so as to devise appropriate policies.

Dr Dang Thi Thu Hoai from CIEM said resources should be gathered instead of being scattered in different fields and programmes like at present. She added ethnic minority policies over the years have resulted in positive outcomes, helping to improve ethnic minority and mountainous areas./.

Social mobility in Vietnam is lagging behind its economic growth over the last decade, as the country’s poor still lack access to learn new skills and gain better jobs.

A new report "Social Mobility and Equality of Opportunity in Vietnam: Trends and Impact factors” launched by Oxfam on March 29 highlighted the problem and the threat it poses to the country’s sustainable growth.

The report consolidates data from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2004 -14 and interviews with about 700 people over the last two years in three provinces of Lao Cai, Nghe An and Dak Nong in the north, central and Central Highland regions, respectively.

Social mobility is defined as a change in the social status of an individual or household. Social mobility can refer to a change an adult experiences as compared with his/her parents – intergenerational social mobility – or a change over a single person’s life cycle – intra-generational social mobility.

In the Oxfam report, social mobility is analysed in three areas, namely occupation, skills and income.

According to the report, in Vietnam, occupational mobility is limited, with 79 percent of agriculture workers in 2004 continuing to work in agriculture in 2008, and even rising to 83 percent during the 2010 – 14 period. Meanwhile, less than eight percent of agriculture workers moved into the industry or service sectors during either period.

The country saw slow improvement in skill development. The survey showed that during each period, 2004-08 and 2010-14, only a fifth of manual workers joined the ranks of skilled workers in either blue-collar or white-collar fields.  

The problem is especially acute for members of ethnic minority groups. During 2004-08, just 2 percent of manual workers from ethnic groups moved from manual agricultural work to blue collar work while the figure for Kinh people was 15 percent.

In the three provinces surveyed, making the shift from a farm job to an industrial or service position was not necessarily a step forward.

Youth frequently migrated to work as unskilled or low-skilled workers in garment and footwear or assembly factories for several months or years and then they returned to their hometowns due to harsh factory working conditions, obligations to their parents or the perceived instability of life at their new residence.

The report also states that income mobility has slowed down. About 45 percent of households in the poorest group in 2004 moved to higher income quintiles after four years, but this rate was reduced to 37 percent during 2010-14.

About 33 percent of the poorest households headed by people under age 30 entered higher income groups in 2004-08, but only 16 percent did so during 2010-14.

Income mobility is higher in urban areas than in rural areas and higher in the Kinh and Hoa groups than in ethnic minority groups.

Girls are more likely than boys to make higher incomes than their parents.

The greater a child’s educational attainment, the more likely they are to surpass their parents’ income.

Hoang Xuan Thanh, who led this report, said that social mobility was a measure of equality of opportunity because it reflects how opportunities are converted into social and economic outcomes.

“In an equal society, everyone has an equal opportunity to achieve economic and social status. Wealth and social position are decided by characteristics, efforts and achievements of individuals, not by external factors such as region, ethnicity, gender or parent’s position,” he said.

The Gini coefficient of Vietnam was 0.348 in 2014 against 0.326 in 1993, according to World Bank. Income inequality between the 20 percent richest households and the 20 percent poorest households increased from 7 times to over 8.5 times during 2004- 2010 and was unchanged between 2012 and 2014.

Thanh said that with a Gini of 0.34, it was time for Vietnam to take stronger actions to reduce inequality. The Gini coefficient measures relative income inequality and is calculated based on income distribution among the total population. Gini=0 means absolute equality and Gini=1 means absolute inequality.

Income inequality between the Kinh and Hoa ethnic groups and other ethnic minority groups also rose slightly from 2.1 times to 2.3 times during the 2004-2014 period.

Thanh said that educational attainment, parents’ socioeconomic status and the ability to pursue multiple types of employment were three core elements driving social mobility in Vietnam.

Poor quality education, discrimination against ethnic minorities and a great disparity between the poor and the rich in terms of access to education are major barriers to social mobility.

Sociologist Do Thien Kinh said that economic inequality reflected social mobility and social stratification. Economic inequality is inversely proportional to social mobility.

In order to develop a stronger middle class, private businesses should be given resources and opportunities to develop because they have the ability to create more jobs and encourage people from lower class to thrive upward, Kinh said.

Economist Pham Chi Lan said that inter-generational occupational mobility is low because the economic structure in Vietnam has changed slowly in the last few decades, with a small proportion of labourers moving from the agricultural sector to industry and service sectors. The agriculture sector still makes up a high proportion of Vietnam’s economic structure.

Moreover, when moving to industry or service sectors, a majority of labourers work in fields which require unskilled or low-skilled labour such as mining, food processing, assembling and simple trade and hospitality services. The work generates little value-added, resulting in low productivity, which fails to improve income and encourage labourers to improve their skills.

Country director of Oxfam in Vietnam Babeth Ngoc Han Lefur said that Vietnam could achieve an increase in desirable social mobility if policy makers realise the great importance of the role of education, quality vocational training, a support mechanism for migrant workers and the need to reduce disparities between urban and rural areas and between Kinh and ethnic minority groups.

“Tackling inequality before it becomes too deep is urgent,” she said.

Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc will lead a Vietnamese delegation to attend the third Mekong River Commission (MRC) Summit in Siem Reap, Cambodia, from April 4-5 at the invitation of Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen.

The event, themed “Joint Efforts and Partnership towards Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in the Mekong”, will create an opportunity for countries to review the operation of the MRC over the past four years and work to realise sustainable development goals.

Vietnam has actively participated in regional and international organisations such as the MRC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the United Nations (UN), the World Water Forum (WWF), the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the International Rivers (IR) as well as enhanced cooperation with department partners such as the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to enhance effective management of water resources in the Mekong River.

Vietnam hosted the second MRC in Ho Chi Minh City in April 2014. In 2015, the country held a panel discussion on water security within the framework of the 132nd Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly (IPU-132) in March and an international workshop calling for joint actions in water resources management as part of the Asia-Europe Meeting in June that year.

Within the MRC framework, Vietnam has work with member countries to push the MRC Joint Committee to issue a statement on prior consultation for the Pak Beng hydropower project, calling on the Laos government to step up measures to mitigate the cross-border impacts of the project.

With the support of Lao and Cambodian experts, Vietnam completed a study on the impacts of Mekong mainstream hydropower on the Mekong Delta in 2015 and joint research on sustainable development and management of the Mekong River basin in 2017.

In April 2014, Vietnam became the 35th member of the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses. Vietnam was the first country in the MRC to join the convention, which came into force in August 2014.

Vietnam is persuading other ASEAN member nations to join the convention to strengthen legal mechanisms to facilitate the management and sustainable development of water resources in the Mekong River.

The country has also promoted the protection and effective use of water resources in regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), the US Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), the Mekong-Japan Cooperation (MJ), the Mekong-Korea Cooperation and the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation.

The 4,800km-long Mekong River flows through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Its basin spreads over 795,000 square kilometres with 65 million people in the four countries of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

The Mekong Committee was established in 1956 under the auspices of the UN to coordinate aid and manage resources in the river basin. In 1995, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam signed an Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River and set up the MRC as a replacement for the Mekong Committee.

The MRC holds its summit every four years, starting from 2010. The first MRC summit was held in Hua Hin, Thailand in 2010 and the second one took place in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam in 2014.

The Secretariat has issued a decision on continuously implementing Directive No. 44-CT/TW, dated 20 July 2010, of the Secretariat of the 10th Party Central Committee on human rights work in the new situation. This decision reaffirms the Communist Party of Vietnam’s and the State of Vietnam’s consistent viewpoint of respecting and promoting human rights, including those of press freedom.

That decision denounces wrong viewpoints and disinformation about human rights in Vietnam, including those of press freedom.

Press freedom from the angle of international law

Internationally, press freedom is regulated specifically in international law. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1996, confirms that: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

The article further states that “the exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”

Meanwhile, Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses that “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”

The laws of many countries also regulate press freedom specifically. Consequently, the exercise of this right must be within the legal framework. Article 5 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany also regulates that: “Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed.” However, Article 18 of this law stresses that “Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press ... in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights.”

Therefore, international law as well as that of other countries’ regulate that the freedom of the press is not an absolute right. When observing this privilege, man has to observe certain limits to protect common interests of the society, state, and other citizens.

Respecting and ensuring press freedom – a consistent viewpoint

President Ho Chi Minh and the CPV consistently uphold the viewpoint of respecting and protecting basic human rights, including press freedom. On the basis of translating international laws into local ones, the first constitution of the country, the Vietnamese Constitution of 1946, regulates that its citizens have the right to press freedom which is protected by law. Later on, other constitutions of the country reaffirm that of press freedom. Article 25 of the Constitution 2013 clearly states that: “The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations. The practice of these rights shall be provided by the law.” And, Point 2 of Article of this Constitution confirms that “Human rights and citizen’s rights shall only be restricted in imperative circumstances  for  the  reasons  of  national  defense,  national  security,  social  order and security, social morality, and the health of the community.” This regulation is also transposed into many Vietnam’s legal documents such as the Penal Code 2015 and the Media Law 2016.

Plots to distort and sabotage

In recent years, hostile forces have took advantages of Vietnam’s shortcomings in implementing policies and laws to denounce Vietnam of “lacking freedom of the expression and press,” “censoring and tightening the freedom of press and the internet,” “arresting bloggers.” They intentionally gave a wrong and partial assessment on freedom of the press in Vietnam to wrongly accuse Vietnam of violating democracy and human rights to lower the country’s prestige in the international arena.

They also quoted regulations of international and Vietnamese laws on freedom of the press but intentionally ignored obligatory terms related to those regulations and then spread them on social networks to misinform that freedom of the press is an absolute right. By doing so, they also advocated dissidents and those who take use of freedom of the press to operate more resolutely.

Moreover, they tried to influence the U.S. Congress and western countries’ parliaments to pass bills, resolutions, and annual reports etc. with biased contents on democracy, human rights, and freedom of the press in Vietnam. Despite acknowledging that Vietnam made “progress in democracy and human rights,” they still wrongly accused the country of violating “freedom of the press,” suppressing and illegally arresting bloggers.” Some of them even influenced extreme politicians in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., to organize hearings or workshops to distort about freedom of the press and democracy in Vietnam in order to seek a U.N. resolution that go against Vietnam’s interests.

There have been many activities to unite the opposed, political opportunists, and corrupt reporters to write intensively to distort the facts about democracy and press freedom in Vietnam and then disseminate this misinformation on the Internet. Especially, they also established online clubs and forums under the guise of striving “freedom of expression and press” to gather forces and form organizations to fight against the Party and State of Vietnam.

Achievements in thwarting distortion

In reality, Vietnam has recorded remarkable achievements in ensuring freedom of the press for its citizens. According to the Ministry of Information and Communications, by June 2017, the country had 982 registered media agencies, including 193 newspapers, 639 magazines, and 150 online media. The statistics also reveal that over 17,000 journalists were granted press cards.

In Vietnam, the press has truly become a bridge to connect the “Party’s guideline” with the “people’s desires,” creating social consensus, promoting social development, becoming a tool for the people to monitor legal enforcement activities, and providing feedback for government policy. That is vivid evidence of freedom of the press in Vietnam.

Recently, Vietnam has brought to court some individuals who tried to abuse the freedom of expression and press to violate the interests of the State and people. This was in keeping with international laws and those of other countries in this field.

The freedom of the press is a basic civil right. However, the implementation of this right must comply with legal regulations to ensure the liberties of one party do not infringe those of another...

The freedom of the press is a basic civil right. However, the implementation of this right must comply with legal regulations to ensure the liberties of one party do not infringe those of another./.