In the wake of a New Cold War (Part I)
6/11/14
The term
"Cold War" has been resurrected in recent months as the conflict in Ukraine
has ebbed and flowed. A cease-fire
agreement has stilled full-scale fighting for now, but the peace is fragile
and the conflict far from settled.
The New Cold War
Although not strictly the beginning of
the crisis, use of the term "Cold War II" and speculation over its
appropriateness grew as tensions between Russia and the West escalated through
the 2014 Russian military
intervention in Ukraine, the Russian involvement in the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, an action
for which pro-Russian separatists were held
responsible. By August 2014, both sides had implemented economic, financial,
and diplomatic sanctions upon each other. Russia is temporarily suspended
from the G8 following
their annexation of the
Crimean peninsula in March.[9] As
such, the G8 summit originally planned to take place in Sochi,
Russia earlier in June was
cancelled; instead, an alternative G7 summit was held in Brussels,
Belgium,
courtesy of the European Union.
However, no one
should casually label the current confrontation between Russia and the
West a “new Cold War.” After all, the current crisis hardly matches the depth
and scale of the contest that dominated the international system in the second
half of the twentieth century. And accepting the premise that Russia and the
West are locked in such a conflict could lead policymakers to pursue the wrong,
even dangerous strategies. Using such a label is thus a serious matter.
As fighting in Ukraine appears to intensify and separatists
conduct a referendum on independence, observers in the United States, Europe, Russia and elsewhere are increasingly thinking
and talking about a second Cold War between America
and Russia.
But would such a confrontation truly be a second Cold War or would it in fact
be something else entirely? These five key differences suggest that if there is
a prolonged struggle between Washington and Moscow, it may not work
in the ways that many seem to expect.
First, the United States
and Russia are not equals: Russia is no longer anything like a superpower peer of the United States. America’s economy is eight times Russia’s and
the same is true of the European Union’s total economy, making a combined
sixteen-to-one ratio. The U.S. defense budget is
seven times Russia’s. Moreover, notwithstanding some erosion, the United States is in a stronger position
internationally that it was during much of the Cold War, retains a significant
technological and soft-power edge over Russia, and has expanding energy
resources too. Russia’s
economy has fallen into recession and is facing accelerated capital flight; Russia simply cannot sustain a long-term
confrontation with the West in the way that the Soviet
Union did. A new Cold War would not be a seventy-year endeavor.
Some might assume
that the new Cold War, although undesirable, won’t matter nearly as much as the
last one did, especially since modern Russia
presents a mere shadow of the threat once posed by the Soviet
Union. It is true, of course, that the United
States enjoys massive material advantages over its
adversary: its economy is around eight times as large as Russia’s, and
its military budget is seven times as large. Moreover, the magnitude of the
other challenges Washington faces, from
turbulence in the Middle East to rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific, might
make a collapse of Russia’s
relations with the United States
and most of Europe seem relatively
unimportant.
The new Cold War
with the United States and
Europe will hurt Russia even
more, especially because Moscow
is much more dependent on the West than vice versa, in at least one critical
respect. To diversify its resource-dependent economy and modernize its aging,
Soviet-era infrastructure, Russia
has counted on an inflow of Western capital and technology. To the degree that
this option is lost, Moscow will be forced to
become vastly more dependent either on its relationship with Beijing
-- in which it is a distinctly junior partner -- or on scattered partnerships
with countries that do not offer anything resembling the resources of the United States and Europe.
Second, Globalization and technology empower
spoilers: Many have described how the modern interconnected
world empowers individuals for good and ill. A more accurate assessment might be
that globalization and technology empower the weak (in relative terms), whether
individuals, organizations, or governments. Incorporating the sad and permanent
reality that it almost invariably takes many to build but only one to destroy, Russia’s capability to utilize modern
technologies like cyber-attacks toward disruptive ends could help Moscow to level the playing field with America and Europe.
Science fiction fans will recall Paul-Muad’dib’s statement in Dune that “the
power to destroy a thing is the absolute control over it”—and observers of Russia’s foreign policy will recognize echoes of
this mindset in Moscow’s
conduct.
Third, Cold War 1 developed rules, Cold War 2 has none: By
the time the Cold War ended, the United States
and the Soviet Union had constructed an
elaborate system of rules and signals to regulate their competition and
mitigate risks. All of this is now gone—in fact, few remember its existence,
much less its operation. If the United States
and Russia
enter a new Cold War, it will reset to 1945, not 1985. This means a new
iterative trial-and-error process to define the rules—this time, starting with
thousands of nuclear warheads, cyber-weapons, precision munitions and drones.
And don’t forget sanctions, energy dependence, and angry Russian minorities in
neighboring states. With global 24-hour television and the Internet, this mess
will play out in real time. Governments on both sides will struggle to shape
messages and manage public opinion in an environment totally unlike that of decades
ago. This could produce powerful domestic pressures well beyond what early Cold
War leaders had to handle.
Four, Geopolitics will be different:
The Cold War was a period of bi-polar competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union during which it was difficult for many to avoid taking
sides. The United States amassed important second-tier allies and
partners—Europe, Japan and
eventually even China, when
Richard Nixon successfully split Beijing from Moscow. Any new effort
and containment and confrontation with Russia
will run up against some unpleasant geopolitical realities in China, Europe
and elsewhere.
With respect to Beijing,
too many have over-interpreted China’s
lack of vocal support for Moscow
as a lack of practical support. If Chinese firms sign massive gas deals with
Gazprom and Novatek, as looks quite likely to happen when Putin visits Beijing
later this month, the absence of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements backing up
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea will not matter too much—and Washington will have
few options in expressing displeasure that don’t make things worse. If a new
Cold War starts, it will be the pre-Nixon version, not the post-Nixon one, with
the difference that China
has reversed roles with the Soviet Union, is closing in on the United States
economically and militarily, and is globally connected in ways the Soviet
Politburo could never imagine.
Regarding Europe, the EU is finding
itself unpleasantly trapped by the partial success of Western policies to
integrate Russia that have produced deep economic connections between Europe
and Russia without doing the same for the United States and Russia and without
any real political convergence. As a result, Europe
is divided between big economies (mostly to the west) that see economic dangers
more than immediate security risks and smaller economies (mostly to the east)
with a much greater sense of urgency. And however much Europeans’ hearts will
be with Washington’s
harder line, many of their minds will have second thoughts to a degree perhaps
unprecedented during the Cold War.
Fifth, Nuclear weapons may play a different role: Mutual
assured destruction prevented direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. Whether it will work equally effectively
in a future contest between Washington and Moscow is less clear.
Nuclear deterrence is fundamentally subjective and psychological and depends
upon credible threats to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional or
nuclear attacks. The United States
deterred a Soviet invasion through Germany’s
Fulda Gap—despite Soviet conventional military superiority—because Soviet
commanders believed that Washington
might actually use tactical nuclear weapons to slow or stop a breakthrough.
Bluntly put, the question today is whether Putin (who may be around for some
time) believes that Obama (or his successor) would do the same in the Baltic
States or elsewhere in Europe. Together with Moscow’s huge advantage
in tactical nuclear weapons, the wrong answer to this question might persuade
Russian leaders that they can attack weak NATO members with relative impunity.
This could have very dire consequences. (To be continued)
All comments [ 10 ]
The Cold War II include the Syrian Civil War (2011–present), and 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine (2014–present) and others hot places.
I think this new Cold war will be different from the old one because the balance of strength between the U.S. and Russia has changed as well as the emerge of a giant but dirty power - China!
Russia will use their weapons - oil to retaliate.
Governments on both sides will struggle to shape messages and manage public opinion in an environment totally unlike that of decades ago.
Let the U.S. know thier limit, that they can't do what they want in the world.
Russia simply cannot sustain a long-term confrontation with the West in the way that the Soviet Union did.
Russia’s capability to utilize modern technologies like cyber-attacks toward disruptive ends could help Moscow to level the playing field with America and Europe.
The winter is now coming, and soon, the EU and U.S. will feel the strength of Putin, and that's also when this cold war ends.
Accepting the premise that Russia and the West are locked in such a conflict could lead policymakers to pursue the wrong, even dangerous strategies.
Hope this new cold war will not have anything to do with Vietnam, we have enough with China and still a lot of things to do: economic development, poverty and territorial disputes.
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