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Ukraine crisis and lessons for Vietnam
Ukraine crisis and lessons for Vietnam
23/10/14
As Ukranie crisis is on-going, we
should review that incident to draw lessons for us in our relations with big
neighbor like China.
To have an overall view about that, let take a look at these crisises.
From the end of
February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took
place in major cities across the eastern
and southern regions of Ukraine, in the
aftermath of the Euromaidan movement and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. During the
first stage of the unrest, Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation after a crisis in the region, Russian military
intervention, and an internationally criticized referendum. Protests in Donetsk
and Luhansk
oblasts escalated into an armed
separatist insurgency. This led the Ukrainian government to launch a
military counter-offensive against the insurgents, which resulted in the
ongoing War in Donbass
The Crimean crisis was an international crisis in 2014 principally
involving Russia
and Ukraine
over the control of the Crimean Peninsula, until its annexation by
Russia. However, the current status of Crimea and Sevastopol
as federal subjects of the Russian Federation is only explicitly recognized by five UN member
states, including Russia.
For over 200 years, Ukraine has been a part of Russia. In
1954, Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine
but Crimea has the important port
of Sevastopol for the
Russian Navy. In winter, Russia's
northern ports are frozen over and Sevastopol is
the only outlet for Russia's
Navy to the Mediterranean and Atlantic.
Crimea is populated by an ethnic Russian
majority and a minority of both ethnic Ukrainians
and Crimean
Tatars. Prior to the crisis, Crimea comprised Ukraine's
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
administratively separate municipality
of Sevastopol.
The Russian Federation
has organized them as the Crimean Federal District. With Russian
forces effectively having taken control of Crimea, this is Europe's
biggest geopolitical crisis for at least two decades.
Europe is settling into a new balance of power. For decades,
it had depended on the divide between the capitalist West and the Communist
East. When the Soviet Union collapsed at the
end of the 1980s, that balance of power broke down. It looked as though there
was simply one superpower left, the United States. For a time that was
true. However, as the years passed, and the discontinuities within the former
Soviet states settled back into a new normalcy, once again, Russia, Europe’s
great Eastern power reemerged.
Oblivious to this development, the US along with most of its European allies didn’t
recognize or listen to the alarm bells ringing from Moscow. By 2006, the Russian government was
complaining about US and European meddling in Russia’s traditional region of
influence.
Since the end of the Cold War it has
become accepted knowledge that economic ties between the major powers prevent
conflict. In a world of globalised production chains and capital flows the
general argument is sound – it doesn’t make sense to destroy your trade
partners, markets and financiers.
This general proposition has, however,
led to complacency in the foreign affairs community, a situation revealed by
the shocked and stumbling response to Russia’s
invasion
and annexation of Crimea.
Meanwhile, in the Asia-Pacific, another
authoritarian power – China
– is nibbling at the territorial status quo. The situation is even more fluid
and more open to manipulation than that of Ukraine. Here too the conventional
wisdom remains that China
will be deterred from a range of behaviours by its reliance on foreign money
and markets, or by American
military superiority.
Yet neither economic interdependence
nor Chinese military inferiority will necessarily deter some Chinese actions
for a simple reason: the politics behind force or sanctions matter, and not in
the way most people think.
In the contemporary world, wealthy
liberal democracies face similar problems with nuclear deterrence regarding
states like China and Russia. Just as
no-one was willing to risk a nuclear war over Crimea, so too will no one risk a
nuclear war over islands
in the South China Sea or in the Senkaku/Diaoyu
chain.
However, the
problem today goes deeper than it did during the Cold War. At that time
economic interdependence between the authoritarian and liberal great powers was
minimal. The US and its
allies appeared more willing to enforce a “red line” in Asia.
Then the US commitment to
Quemoy was certain
Just as Russia dismissed chances of
NATO intervening in Crimea, it’s wondered if a single member of the PRC
Secretariat thinks either Japan or the US would risk a major combat vessel to
evict a Chinese occupation force from disputed islands.
No-one evicted China from the islands it occupied in the South
China Sea (at a time when China
was much weaker). Recent moves to shift oil rigs into disputed territory show
that, like in Crimea, China has little fear of military
counter-moves. Rightly so – there is little will for a war over rocks.
Of course, even if
China’s
neighbours are irresolute, there are always economic sanctions. But sanctions,
like nuclear weapons or military force, are politically difficult weapons to
use. Rich countries have used sanctions as a weapon against poor countries, and
big economies can certainly use their market power as a weapon. But if two
states are genuinely economically interdependent there is no reason why one
cannot embark on limited aggression, such as we saw in Crimea.
China is likely to continue to expand its influence at sea.
Actual sovereignty claims will probably matter little; China will simply start
policing disputed waters, perhaps even blockading disputed islands occupied by
opponents (just as Russians encircled Ukrainian bases). China’s
aircraft carrier will be useful here, as “evicting” such a vessel will trigger
a major incident and leave responsibility for the crisis on the opponent’s
hands.
Because China
and Russia
are major powers with nuclear weapons, dangerous conventional forces and
economic leverage, states seeking to deter them from territorial challenges
lack credible threats.
So, we, Vietnam
is now having territorial disputes with China,
but that doesn’t mean we should try to seek supports from another power like US
or Japan.
The important thing is that we need to be independent from China in politics and economy, and
be strong by our owns, that will help us protect our national interests in the
current world./.
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All comments [ 11 ]
Yes, we should improvise depend on situation in reality, don't hurry to take any side, that would bring unexpected consequences.
Crimea is populated by an ethnic Russian majority and a minority of both ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Vietnam don't have any Crimea like that with China.
Ukraine has had its own lesson, now it's our turn.
Rich countries have used sanctions as a weapon against poor countries, and big economies can certainly use their market power as a weapon.
Independence is a prerequisite to maintain our sovereignty and national interests.
if two states are genuinely economically interdependent there is no reason why one cannot embark on limited aggression, such as we saw in Crimea.
However, the problem today goes deeper than it did during the Cold War. At that time economic interdependence between the authoritarian and liberal great powers was minimal.
We should together try to develop and make our country stronger and wealthier, at that time we will not be afraid of any forces.
Vietnam should draw a good lesson from these crisis.
China is likely to continue to expand its influence at sea. Actual sovereignty claims will probably matter little; China will simply start policing disputed waters, perhaps even blockading disputed islands occupied by opponents.
Yet neither economic interdependence nor Chinese military inferiority will necessarily deter some Chinese actions for a simple reason: the politics behind force or sanctions matter, and not in the way most people think.
Your comments